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The term "derivative claim" has been used to describe several different
causes of action in which the claimant's harm flows from the harm to another
person, the primary victim. For instance, a claim for loss of consortium arises
when the claimant has lost the benefit of society and service in his relationship
with the primary victim due to the injuries suffered by the primary victim.' An
action for wrongful death is derivative in the sense that the claimant beneficiary
suffered his loss as the result of the death of the primary victim. 2 The action
of one person for suffering mental anguish caused by witnessing the injury to
another (the Lejeune3 claim) also is derived from the injury to the primary
victim.4
A common characteristic among these derivative claims is that some
defenses against the primary victim's action may be urged against the derivative
claimant's action. Notably, the comparative fault of the primary victim will
reduce the recovery by the derivative claimant.5 Also, the finding that the
defendant was not at fault or did not proximately cause the harm to the primary
victim will defeat the derivative claim.6
Several recent cases have held loss of consortium is a derivative claim of the
primary victim's injury and is, therefore, restricted to the single person policy
limits of a defendant's liability insurance policy As such, if the primary
victim's injuries exhaust those policy limits, there is no coverage left for the loss
of consortium claimant. This limitation to the single person policy limits occurs
because of the construction the courts have given the relevant liability insurance
policy provisions, not because the derivative nature of the loss of consortium
claim makes it merely a part of a single claim or cause of action (i.e., the
primary victim's).
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1. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.2.
3. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990).
4. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
5. Clark v. Ark-La-Tex Auction, Inc., 593 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992); Thomas v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d 1068 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989).
6. Hardy v. Cumis Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 625 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990); Olinde v. American
Employers Ins. Co., 376 So. 2d 1027 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1979).
7. Glankler v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 610 So. 2d 1020 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992); Aldredge v.
Whitney, 591 So. .2d 1201 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Sharff v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d
1223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
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The claim for loss of consortium is almost indistinguishable from the claim for
wrongful death in that both causes of action are dependent on a primary tort to
another person. Nonetheless, both claims are, beyond question, causes of action
separate from any claim of the primary victim.8 The loss of consortium and
wrongful death claims are thus derivative only in the sense that the damages
suffered by these claimants flow from their relationship with the primary tort
victim.9 Neither claim, however, is the assertion of the primary victim's cause of
action itself, as is the case with a survival action. Closely related, in their derivative
nature, are claims for wrongful infliction of mental anguish, Lejeune claims.
Even though these claims are properly classified as "derivative," it is a
completely separate issue to determine whether the claimant's action for loss of
consortium, wrongful death, or the Lejeune harm is restricted under the wording of
an applicable liability insurance policy provision to the single person/injury policy
limits. (An inquiry into the complexities of the insurance policy provisions is
beyond the scope of this tort inquiry.) That issue is controlled by the terms of the
policy, usually those defining "bodily injury," which in turn requires an analysis of
the nature of the damage in light of the wording of the policy, not a cause of action
analysis.
In Crabtree v. State Farm Insurance Co.,' 0 the Louisiana Supreme Court
faced the question whether a Lejeune claim is by its nature derivative of the harm
to the primary victim. Further, the question was raised whether, in keeping with the
current courts of appeal jurisprudence as to loss of consortium claims, this mental
anguish claim was confined to the single person policy limits. The Crabtree court
held mental anguish can constitute a separate "bodily injury" to the mental anguish
claimant within the meaning of typical liability insurance policy provisions. The
court, however, did not undertake the question whether the Lejeune claim is
derivative," as the courts of appeal have classified loss of consortium claims.' 2
Nonetheless, the implication from the decision is that the court would not be
receptive to an argument that the Lejeune claim is derivative to the extent that the
injury to the primary victim and the resulting mental anguish to the Lejeune
claimant are, under the policy provisions, simply a harm to one person. Again, at
this point the analysis is one of the meaning of the policy provisions, and Crabtree
was careful to restrict its interpretation to the term "bodily injury" as defined in the
policy before it. 3
8. Guidry v. Theriot, 377 So. 2d 319 (La. 1979).
9. They may be dependent upon the primary tort in that there must be a tort cause of action to
the primary victim for the loss of consortium or wrongful death claimant to have an action.
However, even though derivative in that sense, they are separate causes of action. The jurisprudence
on wrongful death holds that even with a settlement of his action by the primary victim or with the
running of prescription thereon, the cause of action for wrongful death remains viable. See Guidry
v. Theriot, 377 So. 2d 319 (La. 1979).
10. 632 So. 2d 736 (La. 1994).
11. It is submitted that classification as derivative is largely irrelevant.
12. See supra note 7.
13. Crabtree, 632 So. 2d at 741.
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From a tort analysis standpoint, loss of consortium seems more properly
classified as an independent harm proximately caused to another, just as there
may be a tort inflicted upon a primary victim which, in turn, proximately causes
the injury of a rescuer who has no action unless there was a tort to the primary
victim. There seems to be no difference between inflicting injury on a claimant
through loss of consortium, causing the wrongful death of a loved one, inflicting
mental anguish through a harm to another as in Lejeune, or harming a rescuer
whose injury is brought about by the wrongful act of the defendant towards the
primary victim. All of these are independent causes of action even though
derived from harm to another. They have in common that, while the present
claimant's cause of action arises from the tort inflicted on the primary victim, the
damage and thus the tort to the derivative claimant is separate, even though it
may or may not constitute an independent "bodily harm" under applicable
liability insurance policy provisions. In holding a mental anguish claim to be a
separate bodily injury claim for insurance purposes, Crabtree is on the right
track.
II. CONTRA NON VALENTEM AND SEXUAL ABUSE
The tragic volume of sexual abuse incidents appearing in the supreme court
and courts of appeal opinions has engendered a reaction by the courts to shape
the law of prescription more equitably to fit these unfortunate circumstances. In
Bouterie v. Crane, 14 the plaintiff had been in the custody of the Department of
Health and Human Resources (DHHR) until her eighteenth birthday and was
unable, procedurally, to file suit for sexual abuse. which had occurred over a two-
year period that ended more than a year prior to her release from DHHR. The
Louisiana Supreme Court found, while her claim did not fit squarely into any of
the four general contra non valentem situations, "equity demands the harshness
of prescription should be suspended in this suit for damages for the sexual abuse
of a minor through the period she was in the legal custody of DHHR."' 5 The
doctrine of contra non valentem is not restricted by statute, and the court is free
to shape the doctrine jurisprudentially. This innovation seems to be completely
well-founded.
In Bustanento v. Tucker 6 the plaintiff endured almost daily incidents of
sexual harassment over a two-year period. Her subsequent suit was on its face
subject to prescription for those incidents occurring more than a year prior to the.
filing of the suit. The court, however, found this was a pattern of incidents,
rather than a series, such that prescription on the earliest incident did not begin
to run until the date of the last incident. This scenario is not quite what the law
has come to characterize as a continuing tort, although it is very similar. It was
14. 616 So. 2d 657 (La. 1993).
15. Id. at 662.
16. 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992).
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wise for the court to call this a package of harm and run the prescriptive period
only from the date of the last harm rather than to fit it into the continuing tort
theory. Again, it is a very equitable application of the law of prescription in
view of the nature of the harm.
Wimberly v. Gatch7 is a third example of an equitable resolution of the
prescription problem that sexual abuse victims face. A young child was sexually
molested over a three-year period. Any acts occurring more than a year prior to
the filing of this suit would have prescribed if the doctrine of contra non
valentem were not available to the plaintiff. The victim, a minor, could bring the
action only through his parents, who were unable to file suit because the
emotional impact of the defendant's tortious conduct on the victim, according.to
psychiatric testimony, created a syndrome of silence, a normal behavior for an
abused child. Thus, the contra non valentem theory that applies when the debtor
prevents the creditor from bringing the action was invoked. The court also noted
that equity required the application of contra.non valentem.'8 Again, the court
was fashioning the theory and application of contra non valentem to fit what has
become a rapidly expanding and extremely serious social problem.
It should be noted that the legislature has reacted to the burgeoning cases of
sexual molestation and abuse by enacting Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.7,
which provides for exemplary damages for criminal sexual activity on a child
seventeen or younger. Likewise, in the prescriptive sense, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:2800.9 provides for a prescription of ten years after the victim reaches
the age of majority in actions for sexual abuse of a minor. The statute requires an
elaborate pre-filing procedure by the attorney and an affidavit of a licensed mental
health practitioner.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES LiMrriNG STATE LIABILITY FOR TORT
DAMAGE
What is the status of a statute declared unconstitutional by the Louisiana
Supreme Court? Has it been erased, as though repealed; or is it still a law, though
quiescent and barred from application? In Chamberlain v. State,'9 the Louisiana
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the cap on damage awards against the
state and governmental entities under Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5106. Soon
thereafter, in Rick v. State,20 the supreme court found Louisiana Revised Statutes
13:5112(C) unconstitutional because it set a lower rate of prejudgment interest in
suits against governmental entities than applied in suits against other defendants.
In another case related to the state limitation of liability statutes, the
Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal, in Johnson v. Department of Public
17. 635 So. 2d 206 (La. 1994).
18. Id. at 217.
19. 624 So. 2d 874 (La. 1993).
20. 630 So. 2d 1271 (La. 1994).
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Safety,2' refused to consider the plea that Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2798.122 was unconstitutional because the unconstitutionality had not been
pleaded in the trial court, as is uniformly required by current jurisprudence.23
The Johnson opinion further noted that the liability-limiting statute was not
unconstitutional on its face, which may be a basis for attacking the constitutional-
ity for the first time in the appellate court.2'
To complete the scenario, in Thibodeau v. Mayor & Councilmen,1 the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal faced the question whether to apply
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5112(C), which had been found unconstitutional,
not by the trial court in the case before it, but by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in the Rick opinion. The Thibodeau court noted the admonition in Segura v.
Frank, 6 in which the supreme court declared "where the law has changed
during the pendency of a suit and retroactive application of the new law is
permissible, the new law applies on appeal . .. ." The Thibodeau court then
applied the holding in Rick, that the interest-limiting statute was unconstitutional,
and awarded interest in the case before it in light of their recognition of the prior
decree of unconstitutionality of the interest statute.27
The following question must therefore be posed: Is a statute held unconsti-
tutional by one court thereafter unconstitutional in cases before other courts, so
that, in effect, those other courts can take judicial notice of the prior holding of
unconstitutionality? The answer may be different depending on whether the
court that originally declares the statute unconstitutional is a trial court, a court
of appeal, or the supreme court. A closely related question also may be asked:
If a specific statute (e.g., Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2798.12n) is closely
related to a statute previously declared unconstitutional by the supreme court
(e.g., Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5106 or :5112(C)), does that make the
second statute unconstitutional on its face? This character of common or related
21. 627 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
22. La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (1991) provides, in relevant part:
B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policy-making
or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful
powers and duties.
C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section are not applicable:
(1) To acts or omissions which are not reasonably related to the legitimate governmen-
tal objective for which the policy-making or discretionary power exists; or
(2) To acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional,
willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.
23. See Lemire v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 458 So. 2d 1308, 1311 (La. 1984) ("The
constitutionality of a statute must first be questioned in the trial court, not the appellate court."):
Summerell v. Phillips, 282 So. 2d 450 (La. 1973).
24. Johnson, 627 So. 2d at 740 n.4.
25. 640 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
26. 630 So. 2d 714, 725 (La. 1994).
27. Thibodeau, 640 So. 2d at 831.
28. La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (1991).
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genesis would not be a difficult legal analysis as to the package of six statutes
limiting state liability. 29 With the reasoning in Chamberlain, that the cap on
damages unconstitutionally resurrected sovereign immunity, no other court would
have difficulty declaring the other five statutes unconstitutional for containing the
same fatal flaw and applying the same analysis and reasoning of Chamberlain.
The Thibodeau court's reliance on the language from Segura3" is mis-
placed. The Segura opinion dealt with a statute that had been changed during
the pendency of an action, while the change in law in Thibodeau is a jurispru-
dential declaration of unconstitutionality. 31 The Thibodeau court was treating
the expression in Segura, as to an amended statute, as though it were the rule
applicable to a new jurisprudential interpretation of substantive law. However,
a new jurisprudential interpretation of substantive law is always retroactive in the
sense that it overrules all pre-existing statements of law inconsistent with it. 32
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the rule as to the pronouncement of a new
interpretation of substantive law by an appellate court is not applicable when the
declaration by the court is the unconstitutionality of a statute. Such a declaration
of unconstitutionality is not an edict of the court having the force of a rule of
law. Thus, the Thibodeau court based its finding of unconstitutionality on what
amounts to judicial notice of the Chamberlain decision, in viewing that decision
as a changed interpretation of law when it was not that at all.
The only available authority holds that when a state statute is declared
unconstitutional it does not disappear from the books as though repealed; it
remains a law of the state, but is subject to the impediment creating the
unconstitutionality. 33 When the impediment is removed, the statute can come
back to life. In Dr. G.H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant
Super Markets,' the contention was that a Louisiana statute, when enacted,
violated certain provisions of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. The
opposing argument was made that Congress had removed the constitutional
problems by passing certain legislation after the enactment of the Louisiana
statute. The counterargument was then made that the Louisiana statute could not
be effective unless it was re-enacted after the passage of the congressional
legislation. The Orleans Court of Appeal phrased that contention in the
following language:
One of the contentions is that the Louisiana. . . Statute was unconstitu-
tional when enacted and that the [congressional] Act, if it made such
29. La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (1991), :2800 (1991 & Supp. 1995); 13:5106(B)(1) (1991), :5112(C) (1991
& Supp. 1995), :5114(D) (1991), :5117, repealed by 1989 La. Acts No. 754, § 1; 29:23.1 (1989);
42:1441.1-:1441.4 (1990).
30. See supra text accompanying note 25.
31. The statute at issue in Segura was enacted by Act 237 of 1992, which had not been passed
by the legislature at the time the action came before the court of appeal.
32. Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 150 So. 855 (1933).
33. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
34. 83 So. 2d 502 (La. App. Orl. 1955).
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legislation constitutional, came after the enactment of the Louisiana...
Law, and that therefore the Louisiana law, being unconstitutional when
enacted, could not be effective unless re-enacted after the passage of the
[congressional] Act.35
The court of appeal then quoted from the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in Wilkerson v. Rahrer:36 "[The congressional] act ... removed the obstacle,
and we perceive no adequate ground for adjudging that a re-enactment of the
state law was required before it could have ... effect .... Other federal
cases have followed the Rahrer opinion.
38
Thus, it. is suggested that each party intending to rely on the unconstitution-
ality of the statutes limiting state liability should be required to plead the
unconstitutionality initially in the trial court as it is very questionable that the
courts of appeal, or the trial courts, have the authority to take judicial notice of
the Chamberlain holding.
39
35. Id. at 508.
36. 140 U.S. 545, 565, 11 S. Ct. 865, 870 (1891).
37. Tichenor, 83 So. 2d at 508.
38. Central Pac. R.R. v. Nevada, 162 U.S. 512, 16 S. Ct. 885 (1896); Butler v. Goreley, 146 U.S.
303, 13 S. Ct. 84 (1892); Buder v. First Nat'l Bank, 15 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1927).
39. See Summerell v. Phillips, 282 So. 2d 450 (La. 1973).
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